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ABSTRACT
The article discusses the political positions of Ukrainian’s nobles from three dietines 
in exile, of counties (voivodships) of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv between 1692 and 
1695. These assemblies met together in Volodymyr-Volynskyi. Based on documents of 
the assemblies from pre-diet and after-diet one can analyze political views of nobles from 
three dietines and their attitude towards the king and his politics during three consecu-
tive diets (1692–1693, 1693, 1695). In these times all three dietines were dominated by the 
royal party. In the instructions to deputies appear demands in line with the king’s expec-
tations, and among deputies one can find many supporters of the court. Only before the 
1695’s diet the opposition came to the force. He was able to dominate the Chernihiv’s 
dietine, the Bratslav’s dietine was interrupted, and disputes within court’s party led to 
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they dominated all tree dietines in 1695, and their decisions were in line with the court’s 
expectations.
Key words: John III Sobieski, dietine, diet, Kiev count, Bratslav count, Chernihiv co-
unt, exile, Ukraine
The last four years of the rule of John III Sobieski1 were the time of 
deteriorating international situation and growing internal crisis of the 
Commonwealth. The problems of the state were noticeable in many 
areas. One of them was the increasing incapability of the armies of the 
Commonwealth to carry out effective military actions during the war with 
the Ottoman Empire. The last large-scale campaign was organized in 1691, 
e.g. thanks to the taxes imposed a year earlier by Sejm. The king himself took 
part in the attack on Moldavia, together with not only prince Jakub, but also 
the younger one, Aleksander. Although armies managed to capture a few 
Moldavian fortresses and leave Polish crews in them during the campaign, 
it surely was not enough, taking into consideration the ambitious plans of 
the monarch, who wanted to separate Crimea from Turkey completely2. 
During the subsequent years, Sobieski watched military actions closely 
and tried to coordinate them, but he did not fight himself and left the 
direct command to hetmans – Stanisław Jan Jabłonowski and Feliks 
Kazimierz Potocki. However, they were not as talented commanders as 
the king3. Their limited activity, consisting mostly in the attempts to block 
Kamianets and keeping the previously occupied land, resulted not only 
from their commanding skills. First of all, there was not enough money 
for the war. Moreover, the increasingly more decentralized system of tax 
collection and the disbursement of the collected money to the particular 
units of cavalry directly by the collectors at the particular lands had very 
negative influence on the size of the army4. Many soldiers travelled to 
poviats and lands, to which their units of cavalry were assigned, where 
they waited for months for the disbursement of the amounts due. Such 
1 The article constitutes the continuation of the text discussing the same issues in 
respect of the period: 1687–1691.
2 One of the more important causes of the campaign being unsuccessful was the lack 
of the expected support of the imperial armies, see: P. Smolarek, Kampania mołdawska Jana 
III roku 1691, prepared for printing by Z. Hundert, M. Wagner, Oświęcim 2015, pp. 59–60.
3 For the critical evaluation of the commanding skills of Jabłonowski, see: M. Wagner, 
Stanisław Jabłonowski (1634–1702). Polityk i dowódca, vol. 2, Siedlce 1997, p. 281.
4 Domination of the particularistic tendencies in the fiscal system, see: M. Nycz, Geneza 
reform skarbowych sejmu niemego. Studium z dziejów skarbowo-wojskowych z lat 1697–1717, 
Oświęcim 2016, p. 102; R. Rybarski, Pieniądz i skarb za Jana Kazimierza, Michała Korybuta 
i Jana III, Oświęcim 2015, pp. 389–390.
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a situation caused considerable decrease in the size of the army, the king 
himself estimated that the number of soldiers decreased by as many as one 
thousand5. There were also other causes of decreasing number of soldiers 
in units – diseases, desertions, or self-willed abandoning of cavalry units 
and regiments by soldiers seeking additional livelihood due to the lack 
of regular disbursements of soldier’s pay. All of this resulted in the 
number of soldiers under control of the commanders being completely 
different compared to the computs fixed during Sejm; sometimes in the 
camp there were cavalry units with only a few horses6. In connection with 
such a difficult situation, we should not be surprised that the rare military 
successes7 during the last years of the rule of Sobieski were overshadowed 
by the defeats and failures.
The unfavorable situation at the front had influence on the foreign 
policy. Decreasing probability of a military victory8 motivated the court to 
seek other solutions, including separate peace, to which the representatives 
of Versailles were persistently trying to convince the court. Although in 
1690, the Commonwealth for the second time distanced itself from France 
with respect to diplomacy, removing the French residents – Gravel and du 
Teil – from Warsaw, the operation was not so drastic as the one of the year 
1683. Marquis de Bethune stayed in the country and, as brother-in-law of 
5 R. Kołodziej, Funkcjonowanie systemu podatkowego Rzeczypospolitej i jego wpływ na wojnę 
z Turcją w czasach Jana III Sobieskiego, in: Pecunia nervus belli. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków 
międzynarodowych w XV–XVIII wieku, eds. M. Markiewicz, R. Skowron, F. Wolański, 
Katowice 2016, p. 251; one more problem, related to the fact that sometimes one unit had to 
send delegates to many voivodeships and lands, was pointed out by Z. Hundert, Repartycja 
jednostek wojska koronnego według komisji lwowskiej w 1679 r., ‘Przegląd Historyczno-
Wojskowy’ 2016, 18, 2–3, p. 23.
6 Information about the condition of the army e.g. Komput wojska JKM i RP w Brzeżanach 
spisany die 20 II 1693 r.; some of the cavalry units consisted of between eleven and nineteen 
horses, while the armoured cavalry unit of the Crown chamberlain consisted of only 9 
horses, Natsyyanal’ny Histarychny Arkhiw Byelarusi Minsk [hereinafter: NHABM], f. 695, 
inv. 1, ref. no. 55, sheets 111–111v.
7 The most famous was intercepting in 1694, by hetman Jabłonowski, of zachara 
transported to Kamianets, see: M. Wagner, Stanisław, vol. 2, pp. 97–101; D. Kołodziejczyk, 
Podole pod panowaniem tureckim. Ejalet kamieniecki 1672–1699, Warszawa 1994, p. 125; 
Diariusz opisujący bitwę pod Uścieczkiem 6 X 1694 r., in: M. Wagner, Źródła do dziejów wojny 
polsko-tureckiej w latach 1683–1699, Oświęcim 2016, pp. 154–156; to celebrate the victory, 
there was even a commemorative medal minted, see: A. Czarniecka, Nikt nie słucha mnie za 
życia... Jan III w walce z opozycyjną propagandą (1684–1696), Warszawa 2009, p. 61.
8 In 1690, the Turks gained many military victories (e.g. they occupied Belgrad once 
again) that made it impossible for the Dutch and English mediation, which was planned 
back than, to be effective, see: K. Piwarski, Sprawa pośrednictwa tatarskiego w wojnie polsko-




Sobieski, he was treated as a representative of the royal family, while he de 
facto performed the function of a French resident in the Commonwealth. 
After he left to Stockholm in Spring 16929, Vidame d’Esneval, envoy, came 
to the country. Vidame, after his death (15 February 1693), was replaced 
by another representative of Versailles, Melchior de Polignac, who later 
proved his high effectiveness and who persistently tried to change the 
foreign policy of Sobieski. Emperor Leopold I tried to counteract the 
French influences. In 1690, he agreed to the marriage of prince Jakub 
with Hedwig Elisabeth of Neuburg, the sister of the empress, which 
took place in March 1691. This operation, which ended the perennial 
search for a suitable candidate for wife of the prince, was to mitigate the 
outrage in Commonwealth caused by the ‘Berlin affront’10. The marriage 
impeded the communication of the Polish court with Paris for a certain 
period, however, the relation with Vienna was not free from conflicts and 
frictions11. The court of Sobieski family, after the campaign of the year 
1691, was aware of the huge difficulties the continuation of the war would 
pose due to the lack of money and this situation encouraged to consider 
prospective propositions of separate peace12. Such propositions were 
presented in mid-1692 in the Commonwealth by the Crimea diplomat, 
Derwish Gazi murza, a delegate of khan Safa Girej13. His propositions, 
in combination with the constant efforts of France, began to bring certain 
results. Especially queen Ludwika Maria supported the idea of change 
in diplomacy. The queen, in connection with the deteriorating health 
condition of her husband, decided to take active political steps, called by 
9 That mission was related to the matrimonial plans of Sobiescy family and another 
project of alliance between the Commonwealth and Sweden and Denmark. During that 
mission, de Bethune died on 2 October 1692, see: O. Forst de Battaglia, Jan Sobieski król 
Polski, transl. K. Szyszkowska, introduction Z. Wójcik, Warszawa 1983, p. 348.
10 Various matrimonial plans related to prince Jakub are discussed in detail by 
A. Skrzypietz, Królewscy synowie – Jakub, Aleksander i Konstanty Sobiescy, Katowice 2011, 
pp. 113–119, 143–147, 155–182.
11 Vienna did not want accept the right of Poland to incorporate Moldavia for a long 
time and it did not accept them at all in respect of Valachia; moreover, Sobieski held a grudge 
due to not sufficient support during the campaign of 1691, as well as in connection with the 
stationing of imperial soldiers in Spisz domain.
12 The peace between the emperor and Turkey was included also in plans of the 
countries actively operating at seas that is England and the Netherlands, proposing to 
mediate conflict, which would make it possible for the Habsburgs to quickly become 
involved in the war against France, see: K. Piwarski, Sprawa, pp. 356–357.
13 His mission has been discussed in detail by K. Piwarski, Sprawa, p. 358; the 
propositions were quite promising, as they assumed that Poland regains control over the 
Ukraine, Podolia and Kamianets with intact fortifications.
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historiographers the ‘diplomacy of Marysieńka’14. These plans, in general, 
included closer cooperation with France and, at the same time, an attempt 
to sign a separate peace treaty under the conditions that would be as 
favorable as possible to Sobiescy family. According to Zbigniew Wójcik, 
the king accepted the operations of the queen and Kazimierz Piwarski 
suggested that he could have even inspired them and that he did not cease 
to control the foreign policy during his rule15. If that was actually the case, 
then it is worth underlining that he showed great reserve as regards the 
plans of his wife, probably because he was aware of the difficulties related 
to their implementation16. However, it does not mean that he did not hope 
for some positive result of the ongoing peace talks. In order to increase 
the chance of achieving it, as well as to make negotiations effective, the 
nobility should be convinced that peace treaty needs to be signed and 
rather wide support of the nobility should be ensured. The acceptance of 
the project by a broad group of citizens made it possible for the court to be 
flexible and to choose the most favorable political options.
In the internal policy in the years 1690–1692, a certain stabilisation was 
noticeable, due to the leaders of the opposition, the Lithuanian Sapieha 
family, being relatively loyal to the king17. However, it did not mean that 
they were not strengthening their position in Grand Duchy by expanding 
the group of their clients, taking control of subsequent dietines and the 
Lithuanian Tribunal18. According to the French diplomats, Sapiehowie 
14 For the detailed discussion of these operations, see: O. Forst de Bataglia, op. cit., 
pp. 348–358; Z. Wójcik, Jan Sobieski, Warszawa 1983, pp. 472–476; M. Komaszyński, Maria 
Kazimiera d’Arquien Sobieska królowa Polski 1641–1716, Kraków 1983, pp. 134–142.
15 Z. Wójcik, op. cit., p. 472; K. Piwarski, Sprawa, p. 362; according to K. Piwarski, 
the king did not want to become openly involved in the projects the nobility considered 
suspicious and preferred delegating them to the queen. 
16 The caution of Sobieski resulted from the suspicion that the Tatar mediation 
constitutes only a sham operation. He could hold such a belief for instance because when 
in autumn 1692 Derwish Gazi was still in Poland, a Tatar attack and two-week siege of 
Soroki, the Moldavian fortress controlled by the armies of the Commonwealth, took place, 
see: K. Piwarski, Sprawa, p. 359.
17 G. Sliesoriūnas, Lietuvos Didžioji Kunigaikštystė vidaus karo išvakarėse: didikų grupuočių 
kova 1690–1697m., Vilnius 2000 pp. 111–114; it does not seem likely that the thesis 
of Kazimierz Piwarski that Sapieha family members caused the premature termination of 
Sejm in the years 1692–1693 was well-founded, see: K. Piwarski, Sprawa, p. 370.
18 For the characteristics of Sapieha domination, see: A. Rachuba, Hegemonia Sapiehów 
na Litwie jako przejaw skrajnej dominacji magnaterii w życiu kraju, in: Władza i prestiż. Magnateria 
Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII w., eds. J. Urwanowicz, E. Dubas-Urwanowicz, P. Guzowski, 
Białystok 2003, pp. 217–229; P.P. Romaniuk, Instytucjonalne podstawy hegemonii Sapiehów 
w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, in: W cieniu wojen i rozbiorów. 
Studia z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej XVIII i początków XIX wieku, eds. U. Kosińska, D. Dukwicz, 
A. Danilczyk, Warszawa 2014, pp. 29–37.
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were becoming almost sovereign princes of Lithuania19. The political 
base developed at that time was used by them in the years 1693–1696, in 
the course of another serious conflict with the king. During the last four 
years of the rule of Sobieski, taking the initiative in the country by the 
opposition is noticeable. The opponents of the monarch were becoming 
more and more bold year by year and due to the determined actions 
they were winning subsequent allies, including, according to Kazimierz 
Sarnecki, companion of the king, even the king’s courtiers20. In some 
sense, such a situation was a result of the worsening health condition 
of the king, but also of the reluctance to spend money to win followers, 
increasing proportionally to the age of the monarch. This tendency was 
widely noticed and the rumors circulating in the country openly accused 
Sobieski of avarice21. At the central level, an increasing passivity of the 
court supporters, sometimes even their helplessness, was noticeable. 
It was especially evident at the moments of crisis, such as the second 
Sejm of 1693. None of the senators present in Warsaw tried to control 
the situation related to the disease of the king, who did not attend the 
commencement of the first session22. The increasing weakness of the court 
supporters was possibly influenced by the promotion of the persons of 
doubtful intellectual prowess and low authority among the nobility. 
For sure, the then sealers, both the Crown sealers (Jerzy Denhoff and 
Karol Tarło) and the Lithuanian sealers (Dominik and Karol Radziwiłł) 
could not be described as politicians of exceptional abilities, skills and 
activeness. None of them was eminent and at the crisis moments they 
could not assume responsibility for the state.
It is worth examining how the increasing passivity of the court 
supporters influenced the local structures and whether the persons the 
members of the court trusted wanted and were able to carry out effective 
activity at the sessions. For the purposes of analysis, three exile dietines 
were selected, which took place in Włodzimierz (the dietines of the Kiev 
Voivodeship, Bratslav Voivodeship and Chernihiv Voivodeship). The 
court intensely and, what is more important, effectively interfered with 
19 Z. Wójcik, op. cit., p. 477.
20 K. Sarnecki, Pamiętniki z czasów Jana III Sobieskiego. Diariusz i relacje z lat 1691–1696, 
ed. J. Woliński, Wrocław 1958, p. 277.
21 M. de Mongrillon, Pamiętnik sekretarza ambasady francuskiej w Polsce pod koniec 
panowania Jana III oraz w okresie bezkrólewia i wolnej elekcji po jego zgonie (1694–1698), transl. 
and ed. Ł. Częścik, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1982, pp. 26–27.
22 The senators counted on primate Radziejowski coming to Warsaw, they were sending 
him letters in an almost desperate tone with requests for his arrival, see: R. Kołodziej, Sejm 
z 22 grudnia 1693 r., ‘Wieki Stare i Nowe’ 2016, 10, pp. 63–64.
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the sessions of those dietines in the years 1687–169123. The basic research 
question is to what extent was the noticeable weakening of the supporters 
of the court evident at the local level, in a place, where the influence of 
the court, before the year 1692, seemed to be genuinely significant. As in 
the previous deliberations, concerning the years 1687–1691, the source 
material is, first of all, the dietine instructions and lauda, this time from the 
years: The comparison of their content with the expectations of the king 
and the attitude towards the slogans of the opposition during subsequent 
Sejm campaigns should provide the answer to the question about the 
influence of the supporters of the king at Włodzimierz sessions.
After the successfully completed Sejm session of 1690, due to the par-
ticipation in the war, the king again put off the organisation of a subse-
quent Sejm. Finally, probably in order to make the impression on citizens 
that the law on the 2-year term had not been broken again, Sobieski de-
cided that the first session of the new Sejm will commence on 31 December 
169224. The universals sent to Włodzimierz included information that the 
dietines will take place on 19 November 169225.
Before the Sejm session, fierce political disputes took place mainly at 
the area of the Crown. This time the conflicts were related to two issues. 
First of them was the attack of Stanisław Święcicki, the bishop of Chełm, 
on Stanisław Jabłonowski, Great Crown Hetman. The bishop directly 
accused the hetman of plunder by the Crown armies in his domain, and 
distributed letters attacking the hetman. The attitude of Święcicki resulted 
in a fierce reaction of primate Michał Radziejowski, who sent a letter to 
reprimand the bishop26. It is not known, what role did the king play in 
23 R. Kołodziej, Attitudes of the Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv Dietines in Exile Towards the 
Policy of John III Sobieski in the Period of 1687–1691, ‘Res Historica’ 2020, 49, pp. 229–263.
24 Bishop of Cracow, Jan Małachowski, advised the king to convene Sejm session 
already in 1692, see: R. Kołodziej, Ostatni wolności naszej klejnot. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej za 
panowania Jana III Sobieskiego, Poznań 2014, p. 73.
25 The universals for the sessions of the dietines of the Wołyń Voivodeship, Bratslav 
Voivodeship, Chernihiv Voivodeship and Kiev Voivodeship, issued in Pomorzany, 
3 October 1692, see: Tsentral’nyy Derzhavnyy Istorychnyy Arkhiv Ukrayiny Kyyiv 
[hereinafter: ТDIAUK], f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 137, sheets 1136v–1140, 1141–1143. For the 
content of the universal, see: Akta sejmikowe województw poznańskiego i kaliskiego. Lata 1676–
1695, eds. M. Zwierzykowski, R. Kołodziej, A. Kamieński, Poznań 2018, pp. 523–524.
26 Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie [hereinafter: BCz], ref. no. 183, 
pp. 481–485; R. Kołodziej, Między sacrum i profanum. O politycznej roli biskupów w czasach 
Jana III Sobieskiego, in: Staropolski ogląd świata. Kultura staropolska – poszukiwanie sacrum 
odnajdywanie profanum, eds. B. Rok, F. Wolański, Toruń 2013, p. 293; the dispute of Święcicki 
with Jabłonowski commenced already in 1691, when during the April Senate council 
session an argument between them took place, see: A. Kamieński, Polska a Brandenburgia-
Prusy w drugiej połowie XVII wieku. Dzieje polityczne, Poznań 2002, p. 338.
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that incident, but he probably did not know about it at the moment of its 
occurrence. For sure, bishop Święcicki was a supporter of the monarch. 
However, during the discussed period, unusually good relations with the 
court were maintained by both the primate Michał Radziejowski and the 
hetman Jabłonowski, both of whom the king and the queen tried to prevent 
from joining the opposition27. For this reason, we could assume that the 
actions of Święcicki were not agreed upon with the court and the king 
could not have been pleased with them. Probably, the most convenient 
thing to do would be to hush up the conflict, which however (due to both, 
resentful sides: the hetman and the Chełm bishop) became widely known 
and was discussed at the sessions of dietines28. The second issue, intensely 
debated on during the sessions of dietines, was directly related to the attack 
of the Crown opposition on the king. Jan Chryzostom Pieniążek presented 
himself as its leader by distributing a long letter at the dietines that 
preceded the Sejm29. It included a series of accusations against the court, 
which the Sieradz voivode, with the imaginativeness characteristic to him, 
presented as the abuses of power of the king. Firstly, he included in the list 
the case of breaking the law on the 2-year term of the Sejm. He attacked 
also the confidant of the king, Stanisław Antoni Szczuka, asking why the 
documents issued by the Crown Chancellery are signed not by the regent 
of the chancellery, but by the Crown referendary30. He tried to stir up the 
public opinion with the accusations against the factor of the king, Jew, 
Jakub Becal, lessee of Crown customs and against the Jews employed 
by him that supposedly were offending nobility at customs houses. 
Finally, Pieniążek bluntly reviewed the dietines’ instruction of the king, 
arguing that peace treaty may only be signed ‘bez naruszenia koligacyi’31. 
He criticized the foreign policy of the monarch, requesting, like a populist, 
that the entire public opinion is informed about the content of the signed 
international treaties32. Kazimierz Opaliński, the Chełmno bishop who 
27 Before the 1692–1693 Sejm, Radziejowski was informing the monarch about the 
works he performed for him during Łęczyca dietine, see: Akta, pp. 534–535; the political 
attitude of the great hetman, see: M. Wagner, Stanisław, pp. 79–81.
28 ‘Z łęczyckiego, z rawskiego, z dobrzyńskiego stanęły artykuły ciężkie na biskupa’ 
[‘Łęczyckie, rawskie and dobrzyńskie made serious accusations against the bishop’]. See: 
Akta, p. 534.
29 Akta Sejmikowe Województwa Krakowskiego, vol. 5, ed. A Przyboś, Wrocław–
Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1984, pp. 117–120; Akta, pp. 528–533.
30 Stanisław Antonii Szczuka, actually, held three offices, being Crown Chancellery 
regent, king chancellery regent and Crown referendary.
31 ‘without adversely affecting the alliances’.
32 According to Otton Forst de Battaglia, the case of Becal was introduced by Sapieha 
family, whose Jewish factor was supposedly badly treated by the banker of the king. 
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was resentful towards the king, joined the attack of Pieniążek, by accusing 
the monarch, in a letter addressed to him, of defending Becal. The extent of 
discontent of Sobieski caused by the letter is illustrated by his decision not 
to even answer it himself, but to delegate his confidant, Stanisław Szczuka, 
Crown referendary, to do it instead of him33. The activities carried out by 
both senators prove fierce dispute of the Crown opposition with the court 
and the attempt to discredit its policy in the eyes of nobility.
Legation for dietines34 concerned almost in its entirety the financial 
situation the state was in. The king complained that despite the previous 
Sejm, after almost half of year, was successfully completed, the taxes 
imposed during it had still not been paid by the lands and the army had 
not been supported with the money. He complained about terminating 
of dietines prematurely and the common practice of limiting them, 
which led to postponing the decisions concerning taxes and had very 
negative influence on undertaking of military actions. Although the king 
did not propose specific solutions in respect of tax issues, according to 
Adam Kaźmierczyk, he tried, in an informal way, include in the agenda 
of the dietines of nobility the issues of fiscal reforms35. On one hand, 
Sobieski spoke of the ‘desired peace’, on the other, in a rather indirect 
way, he implied that general pacification, taking into consideration all 
members of the coalition, will not be easy. In addition to the issues related 
to the war, the instruction included also monetary issues and the issues 
important from the point of view of ius patronatus monarch prerogatives, 
that is, preservation of the right to appointment of some Church posts36.
The Kiev session took place uninterrupted, within the time limit 
provided for by the law. At the beginning of the instruction for the deputies, 
nobility included a long text expressing acknowledgement of the king, not 
only in connection with the successful Moldavian campaign, but also due 
to spending of large sums on the army by the king, who paid with his own 
money. Princes Jakub and Aleksander, were also acknowledged for the 
Unfortunately, the author did not provide the source of that information, therefore it is 
hard to verify, see: O. Forst de Battaglia, op. cit., p. 352; for more information on that topic, 
see: A. Kaźmierczyk, Sprawa Jakuba Becala, królewskiego faktora Jana III Sobieskiego w końcu 
XVII wieku, ‘Studia Historyczne’ 1992, 35, pp. 155–171.
33 Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego [hereinafter: BUW], ref. no. 113, sheets 
83v–84.
34 Akta, pp. 525–528.
35 A. Kaźmierczyk, Dworski projekt reform na sejmie grodzieńskim 1692–1693, in: 
Studia i materiały z czasów Jana III Sobieskiego, ed. K. Matwijowski, ‘Acta Universitatis 
Wratislaviensis’ 1992, Historia 102, pp. 63–73.
36 In connection with this issue, a trusted diplomat of the king, Father Vota, was sent 
to Rome, see: BUW, ref. no. 113, sheets 68–73.
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personal participation in the last campaign37. The inclusion of an item, in 
accordance with which foreign diplomats should stay only at the king’s 
court, constituted unquestionable success of the court. It was supposed to 
make carrying out of activities against the king, at the area of the country, 
impossible38. Similarly, the court must have been very pleased with the 
item, in which the nobility requested senators to refrain from private rallies 
and sending delegates and correspondence abroad ad externos principes39. 
Finally, the king has been granted a permission for the separate peace with 
Porta and nobility required that ‘quibuscunque conditionibus, zwłaszcza kiedy 
i od nieprzyjaciela tollerabiles proponowany, pokój zawarty i skończony 
był’40. A long fragment was dedicated by the nobility to the robberies 
by the army, it contained the order for the deputies to exert pressure on 
both the Crown hetmans and the Lithuanian hetmans41. The instruction 
included also a provision against the practice of delegating the obligation 
of collecting Crown duties to the administration. The attack on the factor 
of the king, Jakub Becal, was, however, very veiled, as his surname was 
not mentioned42. It seems that the supporters of the king, active during 
the session, could not completely ignore the outrage of nobility caused by 
a very emotional letter of Jan Pieniążek, widely distributed in the country. 
Probably for that reason, they agreed on inclusion of adequate provision, 
trying, however, to significantly reduce it influence. Analysing the entire 
instruction, we can notice that the Kiev dietine definitely supported the 
ideas of the king.
Bratslav dietine took place on the date set in the universal (19 November 
1692) as well. In respect of the issue that was the most important to the king, 
the nobility supported signing the peace treaty with Porta43. The citizens 
of Bratslav, similarly to the nobility of Kiev Voivodeship, included in the 
instruction the provisions concerning two issues important to the king 
– residing of foreign diplomats only at the king’s court and prohibiting 
senators not only to have private contacts abroad, but also to have 
informal relations in the country44. The postulate of the monarch related 
37 TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 137, sheets 1156v–1157v.
38 Ibidem, sheet 1164; thanks to the endeavous of the court, a large number of Crown 
dietines adopted similar item, which worried the Brandenburg resident, Johann Dietrich 
von Hoverbeck, see: A. Kamieński, op. cit., p. 349.
39 TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 137, sheets 1164–1164v.
40 ‘quibuscunque conditionibus, especially when also the enemy proposes tollerabiles, 
the peace treaty is signed and implemented’. Ibidem, sheet 1165.
41 Ibidem, sheets 1160–1161v.
42 Ibidem, sheet 1163.
43 Ibidem, sheet 1171.
44 Ibidem, sheet 1172v.
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to the appointment of Church posts was accepted as well45. In respect 
of other items of the king’s instruction, the deputies were free to make 
their own choices and they were ordered to vote in a way that ensures 
public agreement46. Dietine referred to the dispute between Stanisław 
Święcicki and Stanisław Jan Jabłonowski. The nobility categorically took 
the side of hetman, accusing the bishop of blocking of bonum publicum47. 
The instruction included also a provision constituting the reflection of the 
attack of opposition on the customs administration before the Sejm. Like 
in the case of Kiev dietine, the item had rather moderate wording and the 
surname of Becal was not mentioned. The deputies were only to remind that 
Crown customs leases should not be offered to ‘Jews, Greeks, Armenians, 
but plus offerentia’48. So, also in the case of Bratslav Voivodeship, we can 
say that the supporters of the king definitely won.
The third dietine, holding its session in Włodzimierz, a Chernihiv 
Voivodeship dietine, was terminated prematurely. However, the local 
nobility, like before the Sejm of 169049, easily procured a new universal, 
on the basis of which a repeated session took place on 1 December 
169250. According to the content of the instruction, the dietine was one 
more time dominated by the supporters of the king, who imposed the 
narration of the court on the participants. The deputy instruction begins 
with a long text expressing the acknowledgement of the king, as well 
as of the queen. Prince Jakub, whose military achievements ‘makes the 
name of Poland scare the pagans’ and prince Aleksander, ‘Polish Achilles’, 
were acknowledge as well51. The nobility decidedly supported the idea 
of signing a peace treaty with Porta52. The nobility was clearly against 
the attempts of Rome and some clergymen, questioning ius patronatus of 
the Polish king. As regards nuncios, the nobility categorically postulated 
that they ‘in accordance with the law on the foreign delegates, came back 
promptly to Rome after Sejm’ and that those who try to question the rights 
of the Polish king during Sejm are deprived of voce activa and punished 
45 Ibidem.
46 Ibidem, sheet 1171v.
47 Ibidem, sheet 1173v.
48 Ibidem, sheets 1172, 1173.
49 After the premature termination of dietine of 5 December 1689 that preceded Sejm, 
the repeated session took place already on 17 December 1689, see: R. Kołodziej, Attitudes.
50 TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 137, sheets 1178v–1179v.
51 Ibidem, sheets 1190v–1192.
52 Ibidem, sheet 1192v; however, the instruction contained the information that the 
idea of signing of peace treaty is unequivocally supported by all members of the coalition, 
which was not true.
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with infamy53. The postulates concerning residing of the foreign envoys 
at the court and the prohibition to send private delegations abroad by 
senators were repeated54. Like in the case of the nobility of the Kiev and 
Bratslav Voivodeships, the Chernihiv instruction included also an item 
concerning lease of Crown customs by Jews55, it did not, however, change 
the document message, which communicated express support of the king. 
Therefore, we should notice that all three Włodzimierz dietines, preceding 
the Sejm commencing on 31 December 1692, had adopted postulates in 
accordance with the king’s intentions. The instructions did not cover the 
issues related to tax reforms, but it should not be surprising, because 
exiled nobility from the Bratslav Voivodeship and Chernihiv Voivodeship 
was completely exempted from taxes and Kiev Voivodeship nobility was 
exempt from many taxes56. Although in each instruction, we can find 
complains related to the lease of customs by Jews, a personal attack on 
Jakub Becal is included in the instruction as well. The inclusion of the 
provisions itself is easy to explain by a great outrage of the nobility, which 
could not have been ignored. On the other hand, the supporters of the 
king managed to introduce in the instruction provisions that had been 
worded in a moderate manner, in order not to make the king resentful.
The Sejm that took place in the years 1692–1693 was not completed 
successfully, it was prematurely terminated after six weeks by Łęczyca 
deputies57. On the basis of the decision58 of senate council that followed 
Sejm, the king convened dietine, which was to consider the way to 
financially support the army and continue war in connection with Sejm 
not having been completed successfully. Unfortunately, there are no 
known traces of universals or decisions of the relational dietines held in 
Włodzimierz59.
The international situation of the Commonwealth was changing 
during the year 169360. The ongoing diplomatic talks concerning the peace 
53 Ibidem, sheets 1193–1193v.
54 Ibidem, sheets 1194v, 1195v.
55 Ibidem, sheet 1195; also in this instruction Jakub Becal was not mentioned by name.
56 Here, it is also worth noticing, that the tax issues were deemed important only be 
Lublin nobility, which was led during the sessions by the local starost, one of the closest 
confidants of the king, Stanisław Antonii Szczuka, see: A. Kaźmierczyk, Dworski, p. 68.
57 For the discussion of the Sejm, see: A. Kaźmierczyk, Sejm grodzieński 31 grudnia 
1692–11 lutego 1693 r., ‘Studia Historyczne’ 1990, 33, pp. 21–36.
58 A. Kaźmierczyk, Pomiędzy dwoma sejmami w 1693 r., ‘Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny 
Sobótka’ 1992, 47, pp. 217–219.
59 The universal of the king, convening the dietines, was issued in Grodno, on 26 
February 1693, the dietines were convened on 25 May 1693, see: Akta, pp. 536–537.
60 Detailed analysis of international situation, see: A. Kaźmierczyk, Pomiędzy, pp. 217–222.
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with Porta, were, in general, unsuccessful, despite their continuation and 
sending Stanisław Rzewuski, Chełm starost, to Crimea. The new French 
envoy, Melchior de Polignac, was exerting pressure on the queen, still 
trying to make Commonwealth discontinue the war, however, it seems 
that the king was increasingly sceptical as regards such a possibility. 
The discord between the spouses was noticeable, for instance, in respect 
of the decision to quickly convene another Sejm. Despite the fact that 
Polignac and Maria Kazimiera believed that it may constitute an obstacle 
in the process of signing of separate peace treaty61, the King decided to 
commence a Sejm expedition, most probably counting on imposing of 
taxes necessary for the payment to the army to which the state owed 
money to. Before the Sejm, however, there took place the events that were 
to influence the internal situation of the country for the next several years. 
Konstanty Brzostowski, the Vilnius bishop, accused Kazimierz Sapieha 
of situating the Lithuanian armies in the Church domain and wanted 
to bring him before the Sejm court for this62. Pasquinades in a form of 
subpoena for Sapieha were distributed in the country63. Without a doubt, 
the actions of the bishop were inspired by the court, trying to counteract 
the growing domination of Sapieha family in the Grand Duchy64. I will 
not assess whether the accusations were reasonable, however, I should 
mention that the row was widely discussed in the entire country, deeply 
dividing the nobility. Moreover, Kazimierz Sapieha was defended by 
hetmans that could not be accused of having positive attitude towards the 
voivode of Vilnius65.
In such a tense internal situation, the king, urgently needing the money 
from taxes to finance the army, decided to convene another Sejm, the first 
session of which was to commence on 22 December 1693. Traditionally, 
dietines preceeding Sejm were to take place before the session, they were 
61 It was the opinion of Brandenburg resident, Johann Dietrich von Hoverbeck, see: 
A. Kaźmierczyk, Pomiędzy, p. 221.
62 The internal situation of the Commonwealth has been characterised in the following 
works: A. Kaźmierczyk, Pomiędzy, pp. 217–222; G. Sliesoriūnas, Lietuvos, pp. 129–138; 
M. Sawicki, Konflikt biskupa wileńskiego Konstantego Kazimierza Brzostowskiego Kazimierzem 
Janem Sapiehą w latach 1693–1696, in: Studia z dziejów Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego (XVI–
XVIII wieku), eds. S. Górzyński, M. Nagielski, Warszawa 2014; R. Kołodziej, Sejm, pp. 49–58.
63 R. Kołodziej, Sejm, pp. 54–55.
64 As regards the intentions of the court in this case, already K. Piwarski, Brzostowski 
Konstanty Kazimierz, in: Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. 3, no. 1, Kraków 1937, p. 51. did not 
have any doubts.
65 The Crown hetmans, Stanisław Jabłonowski and Feliks Potocki and Lithuanian 
field hetman, Józef Słuszka, have even sent a letter to the pope, defending Sapieha, see: 
K. Sarnecki, op. cit., p. 276, annotation 102.
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planned, in accordance with the universals, for 10 November 169366. 
In a legation preceding Sejm67, Sobieski once again underlined the issue of the 
need for financing of the current pay for the soldiers, but also the question of 
payment of the debts the state owed the army that accrued over many years. 
He postulated that the infantry units consisting of royal peasants are restored 
to the normal condition. The instruction contained more extensive, compared 
to the previous one, fragment concerning the international situation and 
reminding about the ongoing talks with the delegates of khan68 and about 
sending to Crimea, with a diplomatic mission, of Stanisław Mateusz Rzewuski, 
Chełm starost. He also assured that both the emperor and Venice are informed 
about the peace talks on ongoing basis and that all negotiations are discussed 
during senate council sessions. These explanations were probably included in 
order to prevent prospective criticism of the foreign policy of the court by the 
opposition and were to convince the nobility of the legality of all actions of the 
king. The last item of the instruction included the repetition of information on 
the issue of preservation of the right of patronage as king’s prerogative.
Again, two dietines, which took place in Włodzimierz, Kiev dietine 
and Bratslav dietine, were completed successfully within the time limit 
provided for in the universal. The first one supported the idea of signing 
a peace treaty, regardless of the stance of the members of the coalition, 
however, the deputies required the participation of its representative in 
the negotiations. However, the nobility did not consent for the peace treaty 
providing for the territorial losses of the Commonwealth69. Although 
the instruction did not contain a mention of the conflict of Sapieha and 
Brzostowski, but the nobility included in it an provision that constituted 
a fierce criticism of the Lithuanian army and directly of hetman Sapieha 
for ‘harms, oppressions, violence and crimes’70, which was beneficial to 
the court. The Kiev deputies were recommended to, before the speaker is 
selected, force the hetman to guarantee that all officers of the Lithuanian 
armies cover the costs borne due to the damage caused71. The instruction 
66 The universals of the king, related to three dietines holding sessions in Włodzimierz 
were issued in Żółkiew, on 1 October 1693, see: TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 138, sheets 
1043–1046v; for the content of the universal, see: Akta, pp. 548–549.
67 Akta, pp. 550–552.
68 In autumn 1693, one more emissary of Crimea came to the court of Sobieski; for the 
entire negotiations, see: K. Piwarski, Sprawa, pp. 351–372.
69 CDIAUK, f. 28, ref. no. 138, sheets 1069, 1071v; for print see: Архив Юго-Западной 
России, part 2, vol. 2, Киев 1888, p. 512.
70 ‘krzywdy, opresyje, wiolencyje i kryminały’.
71 CDIAUK, f. 28, ref. no. 138, sheets 1070v–1071v; the Kiev Voivodeship nobility 
even called specific officers by name and listed the examples of the offences they have 
committed.
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included also tax postulates, resulting from the discussion that took place 
during the Grodno Sejm of the years 1692–169372. In accordance with 
the intent of the court, the nobility of the Kiev Voivodeship criticized 
the current system of taxes collection, arguing against the progressing 
decentralisation in respect of fiscal issues and postulating the transfer of 
the obligation of making the tax decisions and the obligation of appointing 
of tax collectors to the Crown treasury73. The nobility decided also that 
it will independently impose a two-year tenth shilling tax, in order to 
acquire financial resources for the financing of dietine deputations and 
other forms of activity of citizens, requiring financial expenses74.
The Bratslav nobility passed an exceptionally laconic instruction. Ana-
logically to the Kiev Voivodeship nobility, it gave consent for the peace 
treaties, requiring presence of its representative during the prospective 
talks75. As regards other issues related to the functioning of the state, it or-
dered the deputies to comply with the instruction issued for the previous 
Sejm. Most of the items concerned local or private issues or issues related 
to the functioning of the Crown Tribunal. On the other hand, no item con-
cerned in any way the conflict taking place in Lithuania.
The first Chernihiv dietine, like in the previous years, was terminated 
prematurely, however, the subsequent one was successfully completed. 
It is interesting, that the repeated dietine took place on 22 December 1693, 
that is, on the day of Sejm inauguration, which turned out to be also the 
only day on which a session was held76. The nobility, like its neighbors 
from Włodzimierz, demanded signing of peace treaty and wanted its 
representative to be present during the negotiations77. Like the nobility 
of the Kiev Voivodeship, they demanded covering the damage caused by 
the Lithuanian army. For this reason, the deputies were to require from 
Benedykt Sapieha, Lithuanian treasurer, the adequate compensation 
the amount of which was to be specified during a session of the Vilnius 
commission78. In the instruction of the dietine, like in the case of the 
instructions issued by the two previous dietines, there was no mention of 
the conflict taking place in Lithuania.
72 A. Kaźmierczyk, Dworski, pp. 63–73.
73 CDIAUK, f. 28, ref. no. 138, sheet 1072; due to this postulate we can assume that the 
court intended, during the Warsaw Sejm of 1693, to once again include in the agenda the 
reform of the tax system of the Commonwealth.
74 Ibidem, sheets 1074–1078.
75 Ibidem, sheet 1058.
76 Ibidem, sheets 1112v–1113v.
77 Ibidem, sheet 1114; for print see: Архив, part 2, vol. 2, p. 523.
78 The nobility of the Chernihiv Voivodeship mentioned the amount of 110 thousand 
zlotys, see: TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 138, sheet 1116v.
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The king could have been pleased with the instructions passed 
in Włodzimierz. The nobility authorized him to continue the peace 
negotiations. At the same time, in respect of internal issues, despite the 
fact that there was not direct mention of the dispute in the Grand Duchy, 
an indirect support has been provided to Bishop Brzostowski. I believe we 
should interpret that way the list of demands to the Lithuanian hetman 
and his brother, the treasurer. The items of the instruction constituted 
an important argument in the Sejm debate and made it possible for the 
deputies to included in the agenda adequate issues, at the same time being 
a perfect alibi, defending against the prospective accusations of partiality.
The Warsaw Sejm of 22 December 1693 were terminated after only one 
day. Due to disease, the king did not manage to arrive from Żółkiew to 
Warsaw and a group of Lithuanian opposition senators and deputies did 
not allow to postpone the Sejm. Moreover, the Lithuanian parliamentarians 
organized the next a session, during which they created a universal, in 
which they objected to the plans of limiting Sejm, demanded disregarding 
the archive script of Sejm 1690 that gave the king the right to negotiate 
peace treaty and defended the hetman against unlawful – according to 
them – attacks of the bishop Brzostowski79. The king eventually talked 
to the members of the delegation, however, his response was very cold. 
He also did not decide to convene relational dietines and only explained 
in the universal, sent to the particular administration units, the reasons 
for the Sejm sessions not taking place80. That way, Sejm of 1693 turned out 
to be the only Sejm during the rule of Sobieski that was not followed by 
relational dietines.
The attempts to mitigate the internal conflict in the Commonwealth 
lasted the entire year 1694, however, they were not successful. In the Grand 
Duchy, the dispute became even more severe, after bishop Brzostowski 
had anathematized hetman Sapieha81. It did not impress the hetman much, 
all the more so since his Crown ally, the primate Michał Radziejowski, 
suspended the anathema against the opinion of nuncio Santa Croce82. 
The international situation of the country did not change, except for the 
probability of signing of separate peace treaty, which in reality has never 
79 For the discussion of the Sejm, see: R. Kołodziej, Sejm, pp. 47–76; for the analysis of 
the Lithuanian Sejm postulates, see: G. Sliesoriūnas, Problem separatyzmu Wielkiego Księstwa 
Litewskiego w końcu XVII wieku, in: Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów i jej tradycje, eds. A. K. Link-
Lenczowski, M. Markiewicz, Kraków 1999, pp. 85–94.
80 CDIAUK, f. 28, ref. no. 139, sheets 605v–608; the content of the universal has been 
published in: Akta, pp. 582–583.
81 G. Sliesoriūnas, Lietuvos, pp. 147–156.
82 Z. Wójcik, op. cit., pp. 486–487.
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been high, decreasing even more. The marriage of the only daughter of 
Sobieski family, Teresa Kunegunda, with Bavarian elector, Maksymilian 
Emanuel Wittelsbach83, did not change the situation of the Commonwealth 
and did not end its relation with the Habsburgs. Therefore, the only 
option was to continue the war operations, which in 1694 resulted even in 
a success – winning a battle with a large group of Tatar soldiers in Pokuttya 
and taking control over a transport of zachara heading to Kamianets84. 
However, the financial situation of the army was dire and required prompt 
imposition and collection of taxes and only Sejm could carry out these 
activities. Eventually, the king planned the Sejm session for 12 January 
1695. The universals preceding the Sejm provided for that the dietines in 
Włodzimierz will take place on 1 December 169485. At that time, everyone 
was writing texts attacking their political opponents and, at many dietine 
sessions86, sabers replaced pens87. The Lithuanian dietines have been, in 
the vast majority, taken over by the partisans of Sapieha family and the 
supporters of the court suffered a total defeat. The king could only count 
on winning support of Crown dietines, however, in Crown as well Sapieha 
family was carrying out propaganda activities, and the great Lithuanian 
hetman was sending letters to the recipients across the entire country88. 
In the legation preceding the Sejm89, the king referred to the previous Sejm, 
which ended after one day of proceedings. He was explaining his intents 
once again and openly accusing the opposition that it showed ‘who did 
not need the Sejm’. He discussed the international situation, underlining 
the small probability of signing the peace treaty quickly, he also indicated 
the ineffectiveness of the negotiations with the khan delegates to date. 
83 The efforts related to the marriage has been described in detail by M. Komaszyński, 
Teresa Kunegunda Sobieska, Warszawa 1982, pp. 19–32.
84 O. Forst de Battaglia, op. cit., p. 359, see annotation 7.
85 See: TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 139, sheets 892–897; for the content of the universal, 
see: Akta, pp. 588–589.
86 Both Konstanty Brzostowski and Kazimierz Sapieha sent their letters to the 
Lithuanian dietines, see: BCz, ref. no. 184, pp. 543–544, 605–607; Hetman Sapieha used also 
his friends and clients, ordering them to, during Lithuanian dietines, promote his items, 
see: ibidem, pp. 573–575; the campaign preceding the Sejm in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
was discussed by: G. Sliesoriūnas, Lietuvos, pp. 156–160.
87 For the presentation of events of Samogitia dietine, see: Archiwum Główne Akt 
Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów dział II, ref. no. 1801, pp. 1–3; during dietine in Rosienie, 
riots took place already before the Sejm of 1693, see: G. Sliesoriūnas, Iš Žemaitijos seimelių 
istorijos: 1693 m. lapkričio 10 d. Žemaitijos seimelis, in: Žemaičių praeitis, vol. 8, Vilnius, 1998, 
pp. 29–33.
88 The scale of involvement of hetman Sapieha is confirmed by sending of his letters 
even to the individual Mazovian dietines, see: NHABM, f. 695, inv. 1, ref. no. 223, sheets 1–2.
89 Akta, pp. 592–596.
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Large part of the legation was dedicated to the fiscal and tax problems 
and the difficulties of carrying out war operations without money. He also 
drew attention to the severity of the problem of premature terminations 
of dietines, which made it impossible to efficiently collect taxes and spend 
money from taxes. In most of the items the monarch referred to the previous 
instructions, as he did not know ‘what new elements was he supposed to 
add’. As we can see, the legation did not include any references to the 
situation in Lithuania. However, it is beyond any doubt that it was very 
important to the king. Therefore, possibly, the information on this issue 
was to be added to the agenda of dietines’ sessions by the ‘partisans’ 
of the king, in order to adequately change the attitude of the nobility to 
the dispute between the bishop, supported by the king, and the Sapieha 
family. In the entire country, the issue stirred intense discussions and the 
climate of aggressive, political debate influenced the course of dietines in 
Włodzimierz. Probably due to the great mobilisation of the opposition, 
this time it was very hard for the supporters of the king to effectively 
control the sessions, the atmosphere of which must have been very tense.
Bratslav dietine was terminated prematurely and the register books 
do not include information on neither another king’s universal, nor any 
traces of repeated dietine. The first Chernihiv dietine was prematurely 
terminated as well, but the citizens of that voivodeship procured a second 
universal. Probably, the king issued it, hoping that, like in the previous 
years, repeated dietine will be dominated by its supporters. However, the 
hopes of the monarch proved to be vain. The repeated Chernihiv dietine, 
which took place on 18 December 169490, in a laconic instruction referred 
to, first of all, the complaint of Kazimierz Sapieha, sent to the association, 
decidedly taking the side of the hetman. The nobility believed that he 
should be provided with adequate compensation, suffering no dishonor. 
It also expressed the hope that the conflict in Lithuania would not impede 
the sessions of Sejm91. The rest of the documents included only local issues 
and private postulates. It seems interesting that dietine, which has been 
controlled by the supporters of the king so far, was so effectively dominated 
by the opposition. We cannot rule out that the attitude of the local nobility 
was affected by the opinion and activities of the Crown hetmans that 
perceived the attack on Sapieha as potential threat to themselves and 
defended their Lithuanian colleague.
During Kiev dietine, a bizarre situation happened. The dietine took 
place in accordance with the universal of 1 December 1694. Dietine 
90 TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 139, sheets 927–927v.
91 Ibidem, sheet 929.
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selected deputies and the instruction for them was created. However, 
some members of the nobility did not accept the legality of the dietine and 
asked the king for another universal, which they eventually received92. 
In accordance with the universal, the Kiev dietine took place on 11 January 
1695, chose new deputies and created a new instruction for them. Both 
instructions have been entered into the register books of Włodzimierz. 
However, we do not know if both groups of deputies came for Sejm to 
Warsaw.
The first instruction ordered the deputies to thank the king and the entire 
‘family of His Majesty’. They were also to express regret in connection 
with the previous Sejm not being completed successfully93. The instruction 
included many complaints on the army robberies, including those of the 
Lithuanian army. However, the nobility referred to the letter send to 
dietines by Kazimierz Sapieha. It was careful and did not support any 
side of the conflict, recommending the deputies to, together with others, 
mitigate the situation94. As regards other issues related to the functioning 
of the state, the deputies were to refer to the previous instructions. Dietine 
decided also to send delegates to hetman Jabłonowski in order to discuss 
the Crown armies robberies95. The second instruction, passed a few weeks 
later, was exceptionally short, concerned only private issues and ordered 
the deputies to apply the past instructions in respect of the issues related 
to the functioning of the state96. There were no references to the letter of 
Kazimierz Sapieha. The content of both instructions indicates that the 
supporters of the king were still dominating the Kiev dietine. The reasons 
for the quite original ‘division’ of the dietine were probably the conflicts in 
the king’s supporters group. The issuance of another universal by the king 
should not surprise us, if we look at the list of the deputies selected during 
the repeated dietine. It included king’s confidants – Dymitr Żabokrzycki, 
Wiłkomierz deputy cup-bearer and Stanisław Rzewuski, Chełm starost.
The course and effects of three exile dietines show that the supporters 
of the king managed to maintain its influences only at the dietine of Kiev 
Voivodeship. Compared to few previous campaigns, it was a step back 
and the attitude of the Chernihiv dietine constituted for sure a significant 
failure of the court, as that dietine was usually supporting the king in the 
past. If we add to it the quarrels of the supporters of the king during Kiev 
92 TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 140, sheets 404v–405.
93 TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 139, sheet 905v.
94 Ibidem, sheets 907–907v.
95 Ibidem, sheet 911v. The selected deputies were: Jan from Szumsk, Woronicz – son of 
Kiev chamberlain, and Jędrzej Wojnarowski – son of Kiev judge of nobility court.
96 TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 140, sheet 414.
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dietine, we can say that the results of dietines of Włodzimierz were surely 
disappointing for the court.
The Sejm of 1695 was not completed successfully. During the Sejm, 
disgraceful quarrels of deputies took place, concerning who is to commence 
the first session. Of course, the main cause of the disputes was the conflict 
in the Great Duchy of Lithuania97. The attempts to reconcile the Lithuanian 
hetman and the Vilnius bishop ended in a fiasco, which made successful 
completion of the Sejm impossible. During the senate council98 following 
the Sejm, a decision on convening of the relational dietines was made. 
The king asked nobility in the universals about the steps he should take 
in connection with the premature termination of the third, subsequent 
Sejm and a growing crisis of state's political system. The citizens gathered 
at dietines were to communicate with the monarch be sending to him 
a delegation answering to the question, whether he should convene 
another Sejm or ‘horse Sejm’ or organise mass mobilisation. Thanks to 
the research of Andrzej Rachuba, we know the attitudes of Lithuanian 
dietines, the large majority of which took a stance of supporters of Sapieha 
family99. The analysis of attitudes of all Crown dietines has still not been 
carried out. The below remarks, concerning three exile dietines, may be 
helpful while carrying out future research on this topic.
Three relational dietines were planned to take place in Włodzimierz 
on 26 May 1695100. All took place at the planned date. This time Bratslav 
dietine was completed successfully. The nobility of that voivodeship 
assured in laudum that it will fight with any enemy to defend the king’s 
majesty. It included detailed recommendations were included in the 
instruction for the delegates sent to the king, which, unfortunately, is 
not available101. Chernihiv nobility promised in its laudum the loyalty 
97 R. Kołodziej, Stronnictwo Sapiehów a funkcjonowanie sejmu w drugiej części panowania 
Jana III Sobieskiego (1685–1696), in: Wielkie rody dawnej Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVIII w., vol. 1, 
Sapiehowie, eds. T. Ciesielski, M. Sawicki, Opole 2018, p. 115.
98 The senate council session was held between 25 February and 2 March of 1695, see: 
BCz, ref. no. 1674, pp. 9–26; the council activities were discussed by K. Matwijowski, Próba 
charakterystyki stanowiska szlachty litewskiej po niedoszłym sejmie 1695 r., ‘Śląski Kwartalnik 
Historyczny Sobótka’ 1993, 48, pp. 252–254.
99 Thanks to the research by Andrzej Rachuba, we know the attitude of most of the 
Lithuanian dietines, which decidedly took the stance of supporters of Sapieha family, see: 
A. Rachuba, Litwa wobec projektu zwołania sejmu konnego w 1695 r. i walki Sapiehów z biskupem 
Brzostowskim, ‘Zapiski Historyczne’ 1986, 51, pp. 63–82.
100 See: TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 140, sheets 539–568; for the content of the universal, 
see: Akta, pp. 625–626.
101 TDIAUK, f. 28, inv. 1, ref. no. 140, sheets 576v–577. The delegates sent to the king were 
Michał Hieronim on Kordyszów Kordysz, Bratslav deputy cup-bearer, Benedykt Żabokrzycki, 
Bratslav cup-bearer, Mikołaj of Łyczki Dogieł Cyryna, Wojciech on Potok Potocki.
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to the king, ‘declaring readiness et iurata pectoris in oppositionem the 
enemies of the Commonwealth and peculiarly Sejm insults of public 
councils’102. Chernihiv nobility appealed also to the nobility from all over 
the country to collect taxes for the purposes of payment of army’s debts. 
They wanted the king to make the decision in respect of the organisation 
of mass mobilisation103. However, laudum does not include information 
on whether a delegation was sent to the king, but we can assume that 
it was. Kiev dietine was completed successfully thanks to the agreement 
of conflicted groups, which organized two separate dietines before the 
Sejm104. The nobility of the largest Ukraine voivodeship also assured that 
it will stand ‘by the king’s majesty’ and the sent delegates were to reassure 
the monarch about that support. A decision was made for a separate 
delegation to be sent to Stanisław Jabłonowski, Cracow castellan, the great 
Crown hetman105.
The provisions of lauda of Włodzimierz dietines of May 1695 indicate 
that the supporters of the courts regained control over the dietine. They 
presented positive attitude towards the monarch and the reassurances 
about the defence of the king’s majesty indicated that the supporters of 
the court won the propaganda struggle106 following the Sejm. We could as-
sume that the actions taken by the Lithuanians during the Sejm, aimed at 
making the inauguration of the first session impossible, deeply outraged 
the nobility. For these reasons, the dietines widely accepted the postulate 
to transfer the right to organise the mass mobilisation to the monarch. 
102 ‘deklarując gotowość et iurata pectoris in oppositionem zawziętych na RP i rad 
publicznych osobliwie sejmowych insultów’.
103 Ibidem, sheets 580–581.
104 ‘Nad to mutuo między nami certując affectu dyferencyje wszystkie sejmików 
podwójnych przedsejmowych szczerą umarzając niepamięcią praesenti laudo cavemus, 
aby takie novitates województwo nasze mieszające in futurum nie bywały, o czym fusius 
na sejmiku przedsejmowym conferemus’ [‘Moreover, mutuo between us resigning from 
the differences in views of all double dietines preceding Sejm, sincerely letting them sink 
into oblivion praesenti laudo cavemus, so that such novitates causing problems in our 
voivodeship would not happen in futurum, we fusius conferemus about it during dietine 
preceding Sejm’]. See: Ibidem, sheet 582v.
105 Ibidem, sheets 581–582v; the delegates to the king were Aleksander Kazimierz 
Wilczopolski, Parnawa Voivodeship cup-bearer, municipal judge of general dietine of 
Kiev Voivodeship, Jan Woronicz, son of Kiev chamberlain, Andrzej Wojnarowski, son of 
Kiev judge of nobility court, Jerzy of Łyczki Cyryna; the delegates to the great Crown 
hetman were Jerzy of Szpanów Czaplic, Ovruch master of the pantry, standard-bearer 
of hussar cavalry unit of Józef Słuszka, Vilnius castellan, Lithuanian field hetman, Piotr 
Wojnarowski, Ovruch master of the chase.
106 After the Sejm, a few letters that reminded of a Sejm session relation were issued. 
They were aimed at convincing the nobility to the arguments of one of the side; for 
a detailed discussion, see: A. Czarniecka, op. cit., pp. 339–381.
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Although Sobieski did not want to use that right, it could constitute a con-
venient tool enabling exerting pressure on the opposition. The reluctance 
of the king to take decisive actions against his opponents resulted prob-
ably from the belief that such actions could cause civil war. The memory 
of similar events that took place in the country in 1672 and ended up with 
Gołąb confederation did not encourage such steps. The king decided to 
postpone all political activities until the situation in the Grand Duchy nor-
malises. He planned to convene another Sejm no sooner than after bishop 
Brzostowski reconciles with hetman Sapieha107. It was planned for the year 
1696, but the death of the monarch made convening it impossible.
Assessing the attitudes of the three Włodzimierz dietines in the years 
1692–1695, we can see that for most of the time, they were in the sphere 
of influence of the court. This thesis is confirmed by both the postulates 
included in lauda and instructions and by the selection of the persons to 
perform the functions of deputies. They include king’s confidants, the 
deputies of also the previous Sejms: Dymitr Żabokrzycki, Wiłkomierz deputy 
cup-bearer, Atanazy Miączyński, Crown Court Treasurer and colonel108, 
Aleksander Cieszkowski, Chernihiv chamberlain or Kazimierz Załęski, 
Nowogród chamberlain109. Stanisław Rzewuski, sent by Kiev dietine, the 
Chełm starost, king’s envoy sent to Crimea khan, also was the deputy for 
the last Sejm during the rule of Sobieski. Although the parliamentarians 
sent by the Włodzimierz dietines were not very active during sessions of the 
last three Sejms that took place during the rule of Sobieski, we should take 
into consideration that only the last one of them was a Sejm that operated 
in accordance with the standard procedures. At the end of the discussed 
period, the supporters of king in Włodzimierz for a short period of time 
did not hold a dominant position. In 1694, the opposition dominated the 
Chernihiv dietine, Bratslav dietine has been terminated prematurely and the 
Kiev dietine was divided by the supporters of the king. These events could 
have been related to the fact that in the exile dietines there took part a very 
large number of representatives of the army110, while the main accusation 
107 The reconciliation of the two conflicted groups took place not earlier than in autumn 
1695, see: G. Sliesoriūnas, Lietuvos, pp. 182–189.
108 M. Wagner, Korpus oficerski wojska polskiego w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, Oświęcim 
2015, pp. 444–445.
109 The authors of Spisy did not include Kazimierz Załęski, Nowogród chamberlain. 
They made a mistake and instead of registering two brothers, Kazimierz and Konstanty, 
registered one person, Kazimierz Konstanty Szlubicz Załęski, see: Urzędnicy województw 
kijowskiego i czernihowskiego XV–XVIII wieku. Spisy, eds. E. Janas, W. Kłaczewski, Kórnik 
2002, pp. 205, 228.
110 J. Stolicki, Wobec wolności i króla. Działalność polityczna szlachty ruskiej, ukrainnej 
i wołyńskiej w latach 1673–1683, Kraków 2007, pp. 267–312; M. Wagner, Korpus, p. 442.
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against the hetman Sapieha concerned situating soldiers in Church domain. 
The events of 1694 may suggest exerting of significant influence by Crown 
hetmans and officers on the exiles. However, there was no long-lasting crisis 
among the supporters of the king in Włodzimierz, as all three relational 
dietines in 1695 supported the king.
In accordance with the research of Jarosław Stolicki, the nobility of 
the eastern voivodeships in the years: 1674–1683 had positive attitude 
towards Sobieski111. During the second part of the period of rule of 
Sobieski that tendency did not change, there were only small exceptions. 
In the years 1688–1691, the Kiev dietine opposed the monarch stance the 
most, however, the supporters of the court managed eventually to take 
control of it. The other two dietines had more or less positive attitude 
towards the king112. In the period: 1692–1695, all three dietines convened 
in Włodzimierz remained in the sphere of influence of the court. However, 
it did not mean that there were no internal conflicts. The best evidence 
of their existence were premature terminations of dietines and repeated 
universals. The repeated dietines were, probably on purpose, organized 
in haste, we could assume that only confidants were informed about them 
and those that were known as supporters of opposition were skipped. It 
outraged some of the citizens113, but the results of such practices were not 
questioned. Such behavior shows also the great influence of the supporters 
of the king that de facto dominated the Włodzimierz dietines, ensuring 
passing an instruction favorable to the monarch and the selection of Sejm 
deputies with positive attitude towards the king.
111 J. Stolicki, op. cit., pp. 259–266.
112 R. Kołodziej, Attitudes. 
113 The Chernihiv instruction of 1693 includes the following fragment: ‘Niemałem 
conveniens stąd pochodzi cum praeiudicio województwa całego, że uniwersały z łaski 
JKM PNM powtórne i trzecie z kancelarii wydane przedsejmowe non solito tempore 
promulgowane, ale ipso die sejmików przypadających do grodów podawane bywają. 
Za czym occurendo huic consuetudini zlecamy to ichm. panom posłom naszym, aby to 
in posterum nie bywało, konstytucyją obwarowaną było, żeby przynamniej tygodniem 
takowe uniwersały do grodów należytych podawane byli’ [‘Significant conveniens 
is caused cum praeiudicio of the entire voivodeship because of the repeated and third 
universals, preceding the Sejm, of His Majesty PNM, issued by the chancellery, are non 
solito tempore promulgated, but are sometimes ipso die of adequate dietines send to 
boroughs. Therefore occurendo huic consuetudini we order you, our deputies, to prevent 
it from happening in posterum, to regulate it with a provision so that such universals are 





AN INDEx OF THE SEJM DEPUTIES FROM THE DIETINES OF KIEv, BRATSLAv 
AND CHERNIHIv IN THE PERIOD OF 1692–1695
The Sejm of 1692–1693
Deputies of the Kiev dietine of 19 Nov 1692
Marcjan of Szpanów on Nowy Dwór Czaplic, Kiev chamberlain [podko-
morzy kijowski]
Franciszek on Potok Potocki, Ovruch starost [starosta owrucki]
Dymitr on Żabokrzyki Żabokrzycki, Wiłkomierz deputy cup-bearer, court 
Kiev deputy voivode, Kremenets municipal starost deputy [podczaszy 
wiłkomierski, podwojewodzi sądowy kijowski, podstarości grodzki 
krzemieniecki]
Adam Olizar Wołczkiewicz, Ovruch deputy cup-bearer [podczaszy owrucki]
Deputies of the Bratslav dietine of 19 Nov 1692
Jerzy Piaseczyński, starost of Nowogród, Ułanowice and Sinice [starosta 
nowogródzki, ulanowski, sinicki]
Michał Hieronim on Kordyszów Kordysz, Bratslav deputy cup-bearer 
[podczaszy bracławski]
Michał on Krynice Woliński, Radzyń starost [starosta radziński]
Jerzy Żytyński, Vinnytsia tribune [wojski winnicki]
Deputies of the Chernihiv dietine of 1 Dec 1692 (repeated dietine)
Atanazy Miączyński, Crown Court Treasurer, starost of Łuck, Krzepice, 
Łosice, colonel of His Majesty [podskarbi nadworny koronny, starosta 
łucki, krzepicki, łosicki, pułkownikowi JKM]
Kazimierz Szlubicz Załęski, Nowogród chamberlain [podkomorzy nowo-
gródzki]
Jerzy on Markowicze Hulewicz, Łuck municipal judge [sędzia grodzki łucki]
Jan on Shumsk Woronicz, son of Kiev chamberlain [podkomorzyc kijowski]
THE SEJM OF 1693
Deputies of the Kiev dietine of 10 Nov 1693
Jan of Wojnarów Wojnarowski, Kiev judge of nobility court, Włodzimierz 
municipal starost deputy [sędzia ziemski kijowski, podstarości grodzki 
włodzimierski]
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Jerzy from Szpanów Czaplic, Ovruch master of the pantry [stolnik owrucki]
Adam Olizar Wołczkiewicz, Ovruch deputy cup-bearer [podczaszy owrucki]
Samuel on Krzywicze Hołowiński, Ovruch sword-bearer [miecznik owrucki]
Deputies of the Bratslav dietine of 10 Nov 1693
Franciszek on Potok Potocki, Ovruch starost [starosta owrucki]
Jerzy Kazimierz Piaseczyński, starost of Nowogród and Ułanowice 
[starosta nowogródzki, ulanowski]
Michał Kordysz, Bratslav deputy cup-bearer [podczaszy bracławski]
Dymitr on Żabokrzyki Żabokrzycki, Łuck nobility court writer, court Kiev 
deputy voivode, Kremenets municipal starost deputy [pisarz ziemski łucki, 
podwojewodzi sądowy kijowski, podstarości grodzki krzemieniecki]
Deputies of the Chernihiv dietine of 22 Dec 1693 (repeated dietine)
Atanazy on Miączyna Miączyński, crown court treasurer, starost of Łuck, 
Krzepice, Łosice, colonel of His Majesty [podskarbi nadworny koronny, 
starosta łucki, krzepicki, łosicki, pułkownik JKM]
Franciszek on Pereniatin Ledóchowski, Kremenets chamberlain [podko-
morzy krzemieniecki]
Aleksander from Cieszków Cieszkowski, Chernihiv chamberlain, Klesz-
czele starost [podkomorzy czernihowski, starosta kleszczelowski]
Kazimierz Szlubicz Załęski, Nowogród chamberlain [podkomorzy now-
ogródzki]
THE SEJM OF 1695
Deputies of the Kiev dietine of 1 Dec 1694
Jan of Wojnarów Wojnarowski, Kiev judge of nobility court [sędzia 
ziemski kijowski]
Jerzy from Szczepanów Czaplic, Ovruch master of the pantry, hussar 
standard-bearer of Józef Słuszka Vilnius castellan, field hetman of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania [stolnik owrucki, chorąży husarski Józefa 
Słuszki kasztelana wileńskiego, hetmana polnego W. Ks. Lit.]
Wacław Zubczewski, Nowogród deputy cup-bearer [podczaszy now-
ogródzki]
Samuel on Krzywicze Hołowiński, Ovruch sword-bearer [miecznik owrucki]
Deputies of the Kiev dietine of 11 Jan 1695 (repeated dietine)
Stanisław Rzewuski, Chełm starost [starosta chełmski]
Wojciech Stanisław Czacki, Włodzimierz starost [starosta włodzimierski]
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Jan Wojnarowski, Kiev judge of nobility court, Włodzimierz municipal sta-
rost deputy [sędzia ziemski kijowski, podstarości grodzki włodzimierski]
Dymitr Żabokrzycki, Łuck nobility court writer, deputy voivode of general 
dietine of Kiev Voivodeship [pisarz ziemski łucki, podwojewodzi 
generału województwa kijowskiego]
PREMATURELY TERMINATED BRATSLAv DIETINE
Deputies of the Chernihiv dietine of 19 Dec 1694 (repeated dietine)
Franciszek Ledóchowski, Kremenets chamberlain [podkomorzy krze-
mieniecki]
[Józef Felicjan Potocki], Ropczyce starost [starosta ropczycki]
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STRESzCzENIE
Artykuł omawia stanowisko polityczne szlachty ukrainnej z sejmików egzulanckich 
województw kijowskiego, bracławskiego i czernihowskiego w latach 1692–1695. Zgroma-
dzenia te obradowały wspólnie we Włodzimierzu. Na podstawie akt sejmikowych z sej-
mików przedsejmowych i relacyjnych można zanalizować postawę polityczną szlachty 
z trzech województw i ich stosunek do króla i jego polityki podczas trzech kolejnych sej-
mów (1692–1693, 1693, 1695). W omawianym okresie sejmiki te zdominowane były przez 
stronnictwo prokrólewskie. W instrukcjach dla posłów pojawiają się postulaty zgodne 
z oczekiwaniami dworu, a wśród posłów można znaleźć wielu królewskich zaufanych. 
Dopiero przed sejmem 1695 r. opozycja doszła do głosu. Udało jej się zdominować sejmik 
czernihowski, sejmik bracławski został zerwany, a spory wewnątrz stronnictwa dworskie-
go doprowadził do rozdwojenia sejmiku kijowskiego. Kryzys regalistów we Włodzimie-
rzu był jednak przejściowy, gdyż już na sejmikach relacyjnych w 1695 r. zdominowali po-
nownie wszystkie trzy zjazdy, a podjęte wówczas uchwały były zgodne z oczekiwaniami 
dworu.
Słowa kluczowe: Jan III Sobieski, sejmik, sejm, województwo kijowskie, wojewódz-
two bracławskie, województwo czernihowskie, egzulanci, Ukraina
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